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ABSTRACT
NPP Goesgen developed a full-scope probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model, allowing for an esti-
mate of the risk of offsite consequences. The model considers all operational modes of the plant, power 
operation, low power operation and shutdown conditions and all risk-relevant initiating events that 
may lead to a plant accident. The model allows computing different risk metrics starting from core 
damage frequency, frequency of a large offsite release to detailed plant damage states, activity release 
categories as well as the risk of offsite consequences expressed in radiological health effects. The risk 
model is programmed in the software system RISKMAN™ in the format of a set of linked event trees 
with associated fault trees. Analysis tools for the estimation of accident progression and offsite conse-
quences support the model. A plant-specific simulator for severe accidents is in use, which is based on 
the MELCOR code. Off-site consequences in terms of dose levels are calculated using the MACCS 2.0 
code. The full power models are used to support emergency planning by providing information on the 
possible consequences of hypothetical accidents in dependence on weather conditions. In cooperation 
with the responsible governmental agencies, this allows to support evacuation actions in case of severe 
accidents. Simple cartographic aids are available for emergency planning accounting for a possible loss 
of offsite power during an emergency, preventing the use of computational tools.
The paper presents the methodology and key insights of the risk assessment of offsite consequences 
for NPP Goesgen and demonstrates the use of the results in emergency planning.
Keywords: emergency planning, nuclear power plant, radiological consequences, risk analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION
The application of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) in nuclear technology has a long history. 
First, the applications were related to the development of risk-informed site criteria, provid-
ing a basis for the selection of sites for nuclear power plants in an industrial scale (e.g. 
Farmer’s siting criteria [1]). The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s reactor 
safety study (WASH-1400 [2]) represented the first large-scale and systematic risk assess-
ment for nuclear reactors, allowing for comparing risks of nuclear energy to other industries. 
Since then, PRA or probabilistic safety analysis (PSA; used as a synonym in Europe) became 
a valuable safety assessment tool complementary to traditional deterministic safety analysis. 
In general, the approaches used in practice follow the benchmarking publication of Kaplan 
and Garrick [3]. Here, risk is evaluated in terms of a discrete probability distribution as a set 
of discrete triplets (scenarios Si, associated probabilities pi and consequences Ci), taking into 
account the uncertainties related to the assessment of scenario probabilities and conse-
quences. Plant-specific PSA studies for nuclear power plants are categorized by their level of 
completeness and the metrics that are used for the assessment of consequences. With respect 
to risk metrics, PSA studies are categorized into three different levels (levels 1–3). PSA stud-
ies level 1 use the (reactor) core damage frequency as the main risk metric for the consequences 
of nuclear accidents. PSA studies level 2 use the frequency of large radioactivity releases as 
the main risk metric. PSA studies level 3 estimate the consequences of nuclear accidents 
directly in terms of early and late fatalities (health effects) as well as economic losses in 
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monetary units. With respect to the degree of completeness, PSA studies are distinguished by 
the scope of postulated initiating events (PIE) and different operating modes that are taken 
into account. With respect to PIE, we distinguish between internal events (caused by system 
failures), external hazards (e.g. earthquakes and external floods) and internal hazards as, for 
example, fires and internal floods. The operational modes of a nuclear power plant range from 
full power operation to different modes of non-power operation. 
The range of risk-informed applications for nuclear power plants has grown largely, since 
risk analyses were accepted as part of the regulatory framework [4] in USA. References [5, 
6] give an overview on PSA applications in different countries. 
NPP Goesgen completed its first all initiating events and hazards, all operational modes 
PSA study up to level 2 in 1994. Since then, NPP Goesgen has completed several updates of 
the study to address plant modifications, new emergency procedures, as well as new assess-
ments of natural hazards (earthquakes, floods, extreme rainfall, wind and tornado). As part of 
the Post-Fukushima Safety Reassessment Programme, NPP Goesgen completed its first PSA 
level 3 study in 2013. The analysis of possible health effects of severe accidents was the main 
purpose of the study. The study was updated in 2018. The new study results were used to 
support the NPP Goesgen emergency organization by developing tools for a quick assess-
ment of offsite radiological consequences of severe accidents. 
2 SCOPE, METHODS AND INSIGHTS FROM NPP GOESGEN PSA LEVEL 3 
A PSA level 3 model is directly based on the preceding steps of risk assessment, the PSA 
level 1 and level 2 models and results. Therefore, a short summary of the corresponding 
methods and results is provided first. Radiological and health risks for a nuclear power plant 
are significantly higher at full power operation. Therefore, this summary is focused on this 
operational mode.
2.1 Summary of methods, results and insights from the Goesgen PSA level 1/level 2 
studies 
Generally spoken, the PSA model of a nuclear power plant represents a large logical model. 
This logical model maps a set of initiating events (the input) leading to a transient response 
of plant systems to the outcome(s) of interest. These outcomes for a level 1 PSA are typically:
•  the frequency of core damage (CDF) including its associated uncertainty and
•  the frequency of specific plant damage states (PDSs) including their associated uncertain-
ties.
While the CDF is used as the most important risk metric for a level 1 PSA, the PDSs allow 
for a deeper analysis of the plant response, by grouping different accident sequences leading 
to a similar response into common bins. The NPP Goesgen model uses a set of 155 different 
PDSs addressing different aspects of plant response. The typical outcomes for a level 2 PSA 
as used in the Goesgen PSA are:
•  the frequency of a large early release of radioactivity (LERF) and its associated uncer-
tainty; LERF is a surrogate risk metric for assessing early health effects;
 • the frequency of a large late release of radioactivity (LLRF) and its associated uncertainty; 
LLRF is a surrogate risk metric for assessing late health effects;
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 • the combination of the frequencies of large early and large late releases, the large release 
frequency (LRF) and
•  the frequency of different release categories (RCs) and their associated uncertainties.
The quantitative definition of the term ‘large release’ is different in different countries. There-
fore, results of level 2 PSA studies for different plants and different countries cannot be 
compared frequently. The Goesgen PSA follows the definition provided in guideline A05 of 
the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI). Correspondingly, a large release of radioactiv-
ity is a release exceeding either 2 × 1015 Bq of Iodine-131 or 2 × 1014 Bq of Caesium-137. 
The disadvantage of using surrogate risk metrics with respect to the characterization of 
health effects is that the radiotoxicity of different release source terms, made up of different 
radionuclides as well as the different paths for the release of radioactivity into the environ-
ment, cannot be taken into account. By defining a set of RCs with associated source terms, a 
finer representation of radioactivity releases can be achieved. The RCs, if properly defined, 
provide the input for a later PSA level 3 development. The Goesgen model uses 14 different 
RCs, which differ by release path, release time and the associated source term made up of 
quantitatively different assemblies of radionuclides. By combining them appropriately, the 
key RCs (LERF, etc.) can be calculated.
Goesgen uses an integrated level 1/level 2 PSA model. This has the advantage that func-
tional dependencies, as well as dependencies between the technical response of systems and 
the response of operating personnel as well as dependencies between different operator 
actions can be modelled directly. The PSA logical model was modelled using the RISK-
MAN™ software [7]. RISKMAN is a large event tree small fault tree code. It has many 
advanced properties and additional supporting tools like an integrated data analysis tool, an 
integrated Markov modelling tool, an integrated mini risk monitor feature and an advanced 
tool to support risk analysis for external hazard analysis. It provides high flexibility for mod-
elling dependencies by using linked event trees and by modelling the dependencies by 
Boolean logics supported by a special script language. The main PSA software is comple-
mented by a set of supporting ‘deterministic’ tools. With respect to PSA level 2 applications 
and a further PSA level 3 development, the Goesgen-specific severe accident simulator MEL-
SIM (a MELCOR [8]-based application) is of special importance. This code allows for 
performing plant-specific analyses of the transient behaviour of a nuclear power plant during 
a severe accident, including the response of the reactor containment with respect to typical 
phenomena of severe accidents. Additionally, it allows for the evaluation of source terms of 
radioactivity releases for different accidents scenarios. 
The detailed RCs characterized by frequency, the associated uncertainty and the source 
term made up of 10 different classes of radionuclides represent the main input to the level 
3 PSA. The dominating risk contributors to the operational risk of NPP Goesgen are seis-
mic hazards, internal fires, extreme high wind and tornadoes, as well as high-speed aircraft 
crashes. Due to the design of NPP Goesgen (a Siemens-KWU design with a high level of 
redundancy of safety systems), internal initiating events caused by system failures or pipe 
breaks leading to loss-of-coolant accidents are of significantly lower importance. The high 
importance of external events in the risk of nuclear power plant was known before the 
accident of Fukushima. The Fukushima disaster confirmed these insights from PSA 
studies.
The total CDF for full power operation for NPP Goesgen is below 10−5/a, thus meeting the 
international requirements even for the risk profile of new reactor builds, while the LERF 
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calculated, as defined by the Swiss regulatory guidelines, is about 3 × 10−6/a. This is higher 
than for new builds and is mainly driven by external hazards, especially seismic events.
2.2 Methods and data for the development of Goesgen level 3 PSA
The major steps of the development of a level 3 PSA are shown in Fig. 1. The evaluation of 
economic consequences was excluded from the scope of Goesgen level 3 PSA.
The development of a PSA level 3 model requires data, which on one hand provides the 
link to the precedent steps of PSA model development and on the other hand allows comput-
ing the offsite consequences of radioactivity releases to the environment. The following data 
are typically required.
2.2.1 Source term data
Source term data are provided by the results of the level 2 PSA in the format of RCs [9] with 
their associated frequency and uncertainties, release time, rate of energy release, release 
duration and release path.  
For conservative risk assessment, as it is the case for many applications, the number of RCs 
considered in the level 3 PSA is frequently reduced by screening according to risk impor-
tance and sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity scenarios studied bounded the variability of 
releases within each of the RCs. The risk contribution with respect to health effects of slow 
accident sequences leading to late releases was found to be negligible. Tables 1–3 show the 
nomenclature for denotation of RCs and the risk-important RCs selected for further analysis 
of the consequences.
2.2.2 Spatial data, consequence analysis and meteorological data
The Goesgen PSA level 3 study considers an area with a radius of 50 km around the site in 
the consequence analysis. All spatial data required are collected for this area. The data are 
collected for a spatial grid in polar coordinates (r, θ) consisting of 16 compass sectors and 10 
downwind distances. The population distribution is required for estimating the consequences 
of radioactivity releases around the plant. 
Figure 1: Major steps of the development of a level 3 PSA.
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Topographical data are used to estimate the wake effect due to the presence of large obsta-
cles, hills and mountains. The deposition of aerosols can also be affected by the topography 
of the surroundings of the plant site. This information is useful for estimating the efficacy of 
offsite emergency measures, for example, to define escape ways for people leaving the area 
after an accident. For the same area, meteorological data are collected (hourly values of wind 
direction, wind speed, stability category, precipitation and mixing layer height).
Consequence analysis for the Goesgen level 3 PSA was performed by using the WIN-
MACCS 3.11 [10] computer code. This is the Windows version of the MACCS 2.0 code [11]. 
The MACCS 2.0 code uses a Gaussian dispersion model for the propagation of radioactivity 
in the atmosphere.
For obtaining representative results, consequence analysis was performed for several years 
of data collection. Consequence analysis was performed for an average year calculated for the 
observation period from 1989 to 2008 and for single, representative years (2011 and 2018).
3 SUMMARY OF PSA LEVEL 3 RESULTS
3.1 Source term analysis
Detailed accident analysis was performed for all RCs leading to a large release of radioactiv-
ity. The results of these analyses allow characterizing the source term and the corresponding 
release paths. The plant-specific MELSIM [12] severe accident simulator (MELCOR-based 
computation engine [8]) was used for the analyses. Table 1 provides a characterization of the 
risk-relevant RCs.
Table 1: Release category characterization (large releases).
Release category 
designator Release pathway LERF LLRF
RCA Release via the secondary side 
safety/relief valves or via a second-
ary side pipe break (unscrubbed 
containment bypass)
RCA1L N/A
RCB Release via a hole (structural  
failure or unisolated pipe with  
direct connection to the outside 
atmosphere) to the environment
RCB1L RCB2L
RCC Filtered release via an open  
ventilation exhaust line through the 
stack (filter with limited capacity)
RCC1L RCC2L
RCE Release via the filtered containment 
system with failures to recover filter 
capacity and failure of isolation 
after containment depressurization
N/A RCE2L 
RCJ Release via large bypass LOCA  
sufficiently large to cause a large 
early release
RCJ1L N/A
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According to national regulations, a release within 10 h after the onset of reactor core 
damage is considered an early release. Besides the large (denoted by the designator L) ones, 
some small releases were also analysed. For the first PSA level 3 completed in 2013, 21 anal-
yses were performed. For the update in 2018, a set of refined analyses for the risk-relevant 
accident scenarios with special importance for the offsite emergency management was com-
pleted. For these scenarios, additional sensitivity analyses were performed by varying diverse 
assumptions affecting the time of failure of important safety equipment. Overall, about 120 
MELSIM computation runs were performed as part of the two risk studies. The most impor-
tant scenarios are described in Table 2.
The source terms were characterized in terms of the 10 groups shown in Table 3.





probability (in  
relative terms)
RUN-03 RCB1L High-speed military aircraft 
crash leading to a TSBO and a 
small break LOCA
Very low probabil-
ity and high conse-
quences
RUN-05 RCB2L Strong earthquake leading to a 
TSBO
Representative 
scenario for the NPP 
Goesgen PSA level 
1/2 risk profile lead-
ing to a late release
RUN-15 RCA1L Massive SGTR Very low probabil-
ity and high conse-
quences
RUN-16 RCC1L Strong earthquake and TSBO 
release via an impaired filtered 
venting system
Representative 
scenario for the 
NPP Goesgen PSA 
level 1/2 risk profile 
leading to an early 
release
RUN-02 RCB1L Strong earthquake and TSBO 
and failure of the containment 
isolation system
Representative 
scenario for the 
NPP Goesgen PSA 
level 1/2 risk profile 
leading to an early 
release
RUN-06 RCA1L SGTR (single tube) More likely alter-
native to RUN-15 
leading to an early 
release
RUN-14 RCB1L Severe plant transient leading to 
an early containment bypass
Low probability and 
high consequences
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3.2 Plant-specific analysis of consequences
An analysis of consequences was done by WINMACCS. The release source terms are 
assigned to the corresponding isotope groups used as input data of the WINMACCS code. 
Totally, 55 isotope groups were used in the analysis of consequences. A Gaussian plume 
model models the dispersion of radioactivity to the environment. The WINMACCS code 
allows modelling several distinct plumes for each of the accident scenarios. Therefore, 
releases are set up by dividing release duration into different shorter periods; each consti-
tutes a plume. A plume duration depends on release behaviour, which could be decided by 
plotting the cumulative release flow through the release (or leakage) position. Correspond-
ingly, each of the releases is subdivided into a limited set of subsequent plumes. Each plume 
release is modelled as an instantaneous release occurring at the end time of the release phase 
modelled by the preceding plume. The first plume starts at the starting time of the accident. 
This approach ensures a conservative estimate of the radiological consequences. Typically, 
the releases are subdivided into three to four distinct plumes. Sensitivity analysis confirmed 
that a further subdivision does not affect the key results of the analyses. The plume rise 
depends on the energy content of the release. This information is part of the MELSIM out-
put data. 
The radiological consequences were evaluated within a downwind distance of 50 km 
around the Goesgen site for 160 spatial sectors.
Figures 2 and 3 show the computed radiation dose in the surrounding of the NPP for two 
different seismic event scenarios for the most critical weather condition. Figure 2 refers to an 
Table 3: Radionuclide groups of release source terms.
Group Group name Abbreviation Elements
1 Noble gases Xe He, Ne, Ar, Kr, Xe, Rn, 
H, N
2 Alkali metals Cs Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs, Fr, Cu
3 Alkaline earths Ba Be, Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba, Ra, 
Es, Fm
4 Halogens I F, Cl, Br, I, At
5 Chalcogens Te O, S, Se, Te, Po
6 Platinoids Ru Ru, Rh, Pd, Re, Os, Ir, Pt, 
Au, Ni
7 Early transition ele-
ments
Mo V, Cr, Fe, Co, Mn, Nb, 
Mo, Tc, Ta, W
8 Tetravalents Ce Ti, Zr, Hf, Ce, Th, Pa, Np, 
Pu, C
9 Trivalents La Al, Sc, Y, La, Ac, Pr, Nd, 
Pm, Sm, Eu, Gd, Tb, Dy, 
Ho, Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, Am, 
Cm, Bk, Cf
10 Uranium U U
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accident scenario leading to a late release into the environment. This accident sequence is 
very characteristic of the outcome of a severe accident at the plant caused by a very strong 
earthquake. Such earthquakes by far exceed the design basis of the plant exceeding Peak 
Ground Acceleration (PGA) values of 0.6 g. The overall risk contribution of such scenarios 
to health effects is very low. The highest radiation levels are computed for the near site area 
(less than 5 km). The radiation levels computed for the most critical weather condition are 
below 10 mSv. This means that deterministic health effects (starting above a threshold value 
Figure 2: Radiation dose around the site (RUN-05, seismic event, late release).
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of 250 mSv) can be excluded. Figure 3 refers to a similar scenario leading to an (less likely) 
early release. Here, the computed radiation levels are higher, but still below 100 mSv. This 
means again that deterministic health effects can be excluded. As a summary, we can con-
clude that the most risk-important accident scenarios of the NPP Goesgen level 1/level 2 PSA 
almost do not contribute to the risk of adverse health effects (early fatalities or late cancer). 
This is a very important insight from the level 3 PSA.
Figure 3: Radiation dose in the 50 km sector (RUN-16, seismic event, early release).
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3.3 Main risk assessment results (health effects)
PSA level 3 results have been presented in terms of complementary cumulative distribution 
functions (CCDFs). A CCDF typically provides a distribution of conditional probabilities 
corresponding to a given radiological consequence.
The CCDFs produced by the MACCS are based on the random sampling of a year of 
weather data. It is important to note that the evaluated conditional probabilities are condi-
tional on the occurrence of an accident or a release event. Therefore, it is assumed that the 
probability of occurrence of an accident itself is one. The PSA level 3 risk results are driven 
by extreme and rare external events leading to an early failure of the reactor containment. The 
aircraft crash scenario (RUN-03) represents such an accident sequence. Figure 4 shows the 
population-weighted average risk for an airplane crash in comparison to a total station black-
out (TSBO), caused by a seismic event. The risk, in general, is very low. The risk from the 
seismic event scenario is zero, and therefore does not even show up in the graph (blue-dotted 
line). The TSBO scenario belongs to the RCB2L release category, which is a late release 
(Table 1). In this case, there is no early fatality risk (deterministic health effect). Thus, the 
airplane crash scenario (denoted as MAC) drives the risk.
Another important output from the PSA level 3 consists in the evaluation of the maximum 
distance of early fatality risk greater than 0. Table 4 shows that the risk of an early fatality 
after a severe accident is limited to the near site area of the plant.
4 APPLICATION OF PSA LEVEL 3 RESULTS FOR OFFSITE EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT
Results and insights gained from PSA level 3 are used to support offsite emergency manage-
ment. Planning and execution of offsite emergency management in Switzerland is a 
Figure 4:  Population-weighted risk for early fatality (probability of an early fatality for an 
average person within 50 km distance of the plant).
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governmental task [13] and in the responsibility of Swiss cantons. Operators of nuclear power 
plants have to support the planning of emergency actions by providing criteria for different 
emergency levels and information on the situation at the plant as well as on the possible con-
sequences of an accident in case an accident occurred. The information required includes 
assessments of the radioactive source term as well as quick estimates of the radiological sit-
uation with respect to possible consequences. PSA level 3 and the supporting analysis tools 
MELSIM [12] and WINMACCS provide valuable tools to develop this information in the 
format of planning aids and calculation tools. The latter are used for quick assessments of the 
situation in case of an accident.
4.1 Sensitivity studies for the assessment of the efficacy of offsite emergency actions
According to the Swiss concept of emergency preparedness, there are two emergency zones. 
Zone 1 is limited to 5 km, and the zone 2 border encompasses a circular region with a radius 
of 20 km. A third zone (zone 3) is considered to be all the area outside of the emergency 
zones 1 and 2. Swiss emergency preparedness concept considers diverse countermeasures. 
The early phase after a severe accident includes sheltering (abbreviated as Shel. in Table 5), 
iodine tablets intake (within a radius of 20 km, abbreviated as KI in Table 5) and, as a final 
consequence of large releases, evacuation (abbreviated as Evac. in Table 5). The long-term 
countermeasures, to provide a long time perspective of protection, are relocation, food bans 
and land decontamination. The short-term countermeasures were modelled as part of the 
WINMACCS model for NPP Goesgen. For sheltering, dose protection factors were consid-
ered in dependence on the location of sheltering and on the release phase (cloud release or 
ground phase). The intake of iodine tablets reduces the risk of deterministic health effects 
(cancer risk from the absorption of the iodine I-131). An easy assessment of the benefit of 
countermeasures can be performed by comparing the total population dose allocated to the 
population within specific settlement areas for scenarios with and without successful imple-
mentation of countermeasures. The results of such a comparison are shown in Table 5. The 
peak probability reflects the probability of the weather conditions that led to the peak popu-
lation dose.
The results of the sensitivity study confirmed that a successful implementation of counter-
measures leads to a reduction of population dose, and thus to a reduction of health risk. It was 
observed that this positive benefit is limited to extremely large early and thus extremely rare 
releases. For the more likely and risk-dominant scenarios of PSA level 1/level 2, it was found 
that countermeasures do not lead to a measurable reduction of health risks. On the contrary, 
sensitivity studies performed under the assumption that evacuation measures are imple-
mented inadequately during the early phase (the cloud passage phase) showed a possible 
increase of health risks due to an increased exposure probability.
Table 4: Maximum distance of early fatality risk >0 (reference year 2010).
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4.2 Computational aids and maps
The analyses performed as part of PSA level 3 analyses were used to provide quick assess-
ment tools for the radiological situation around the site in case of a postulated accident. These 
tools help to fulfil the legal requirements of NPP Goesgen defined by law [13]. Two important 
aids are available. From MELSIM calculations, for each PDS, defined as a combination of a 
specific containment damage state and a specific core damage state, a realistic and conserva-
tive release source term is calculated. The definition of PDS, in general, follows the approach 
developed by EPRI [14] with additional consideration of containment releases via the filtered 
venting system, which is not available in US Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) designs. The 
results of the calculations are tabulated. The determination of PDS is part of the working 
procedures of the technical support centre of the plant in case of an emergency. The pre-cal-
culated source terms allow performing a quick estimate of radioactivity releases in case of an 
accident. This information is supplied to the ENSI and to the National Alarm Centre. Based 
on the actual weather conditions, these governmental agencies perform an estimate of the 
possible radiological consequences. This allows them to decide on a timely implementation 
of offsite emergency actions in an accident situation.
The WINMACCS calculations are used to perform bounding assessments for the most 
critical weather scenarios with respect to land contamination and expected average radiation 
dose for an individual person of the population in a specific area. This information is mapped 
into geographical maps. Examples are shown below. Figure 5 shows the radiation dose for an 
average individual in the 5-km zone around the plant. Figure 6 shows the intervention levels 
defining different offsite emergency actions in the 5-km zone around the plant. This 









None 6.00E04 4.97E05 1.37E-05
KI + Shel. 2.55E04 1.88E05 1.37E-05




None 1.60E05 9.57E05 1.69E-05
KI + Shel. 6.58E04 4.03E05 2.41E-03




None 3.03E05 1.53E06 4.85E-04
KI + Shel 1.21E05 6.96E05 4.97E-06




None 4.63E05 1.75E06 1.11E-04
KI + Shel 2.06E05 8.40E05 4.85E-04
KI + Shel. + 
Evac.
8.66E04 2.43E05 3.32E-04
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Figure 5: Average radiation dose for the most critical release scenario (RUN03).
Figure 6: Emergency intervention levels for the most critical scenario (RUN03).
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information is used if a quick estimate of the possible radiological consequences in an early 
accident phase (immediately after release) is needed or the external communication to gov-
ernmental agencies is not available.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Methods and results of the NPP Goesgen plant-specific PSA level 3 were used to develop 
tools and simple cartographic aids to support emergency management planning of the nuclear 
power plant in case of a severe accident. This represents a unique application of probabilistic 
safety assessment for industrial nuclear power plants. The implementation of this approach 
and the resulting supporting information allow for replacing the usually more general consid-
erations used for emergency management planning by means of plant- and area-specific 
technical information. 
On the other hand, the updated PSA level 3 for the Goesgen nuclear power plant demon-
strated the low risk of nuclear power operation as well as the possible benefit of offsite 
emergency management in case of postulated, very severe accident situations.
REFERENCES
 [1] Farmer, F.R., Siting Criteria - a new approach. Containment and Siting of Nuclear 
Power Plants, Vienna, IAEA, pp. 303–323, 1967.
 [2] US NRC, Reactor Safety Study. An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial 
Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1400 (NUREG 75/014), 1975.
 [3] Kaplan, S. & Garrick, B.J., On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk Analysis, 1(1), 
pp. 11–27, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1981.tb01350.x
 [4] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods 
in Nuclear Regulatory Activities, Final Policy Statement, Federal Register Vol. 60, 
No.158, 1995.
 [5] IAEA, Determinin the Quality of Probabilistic safety Assessment (PSA) for Applica-
tions in Nuclear Power Plants, TECDOIC-1511,» IAEA, Vienna, 2006.
 [6] IAEA, Attributes of Full Scope Level 1 probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for 
Applications in Nuclear Power Plants, TECDOC-1804, Vienna, 2016.
 [7] ABS Consulting, RISKMAN for Windows, Version 15.0 User Manual, 2017.
 [8] Sandia National Laboratory, MELCOR Computer Code Manuals, NUREG/CR-6119, 
SAND2001-0929P, 2001.
 [9] Klügel, J.-U., Steiner, P. & Askari, B., Full-Scope PSA Level 3 of NPP Goesgen - Meth-
ods and Results. ANS PSA 2013 International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment and Analysis, Columbia, SC, 2013.
[10] Sandia National Laboratories, WinMACCS, a MACC2 Interface for Calculating Health 
and Economic Consequences from Accidental Release of Radioactive Materials into 
the Atmosphere, User’s Guide and Reference Manual, WinMACCS Version 3, 2007.
[11] US NRC, Code manual for MACCS 2: Volume 1, User’s Guide, NUREG/CR-6613, 
SAND97-0594, 1998.
[12] Risk Management Associates, Kernkraftwerk Goesgen, MELSIM_KKG Model Docu-
mentation, RMA, San Diego, 2006.
[13] Swiss Federal Government, Verordnung über den Notfallschutz in der Umgebung von 
Kernanlagen (Notfallschutzverordnung, NFSV), SR 732.33, 2018.
[14] EPRI, Severe Accident Management Guidance Technical Basis Report, TR 1025295, 
2012.
